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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
LAWRENCE J. SORENSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 16827 
STATEME:NT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE -
Appellant appeals from a jury verdict 
of guilty on four counts of Theft and/or Theft 
by Deception in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
and/or § 76-6-405 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by a jury before the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder and was convicted of four counts 
of Theft or Theft.by Deception. Appellant was sentenced 
for the indeterminate term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years. The execution of this sentence 
was stayed and appellant was placed on probation. The 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conditions of probation included a period of incarceration 
in the Salt Lake County Jail of six months (R. at 153-154). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to affirm the conviction in 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant formed Western Heritage, Inc., in late 
1977 for the purpose of assisting clients in establishing 
retail franchising operations (R. at 290). Appellant served 
as the corporation's Chairman of the Board and Manager-Director 0 
On April 4, 1978, David Candland and Lester Thatcher 
(victims) contacted Western Heritage seeking property financ-
ing, and professional assistance for a restaurant to be 
named "Apple Dumplin'" which was to be established in Utah. 
During the first meeting with the appellant, appellant made 
the following representations to Candland and Thatcher: 
1. Western would sell property 
located at 941 South State to used 
for the restaurant; 
2. Western could procure 
one hundred percent (100%) leaseback 
financing; 
3. Western was a large, successful, 
real estate development firm with 
offices around the United States; 
4. Western had been involved in numerous 
other successful projects similar to that 
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5. Western had a commitment for 
$10,000,000.00 from an outsi.de 
financing source; and 
6. Western was staffed by members 
of the L.D.S. Church in good standing. 
(R. 97,98,99,195,199,200). 
Relying on these representations, Candland and Thatcher 
agreed to deal with appellant and Western Heritage in 
establishing the "Apple Dumplin'" restaurant. 
The following is a synopsis, in chronological 
order, of the events which gave rise to the four counts 
of Theft. On April 28, 1978, appellant requested and 
received $5,000.00 from Candland and Thatcher. That same 
day, the complainants entered into an Earnest Money Agreement 
with Western Heritage on the property located· at 941 South 
State, Salt Lake City. The $5,000.00 payment was induced 
by these representations from appellant: 
1. The money was needed for financing 
and would not be applied to the deposit 
required by the Earnest Money Agreement; 
2. The payment was a refundable deposit; 
3. Funding was available if they could 
qualify for such; 
4. All_ "up front" monies would be re-
turned when financing was approved; and 
5. The money received by Western would 
be held in a special trust or real estate 
escrow account. (R. at 99-101). 
Contrary to these representations financing was never 
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obtained, the money was not returned and the $5,000.00 
was not placed in a special trust or escrow account. The 
money was spent in Western's regular course of business. 
On May l, 1978, Thatcher paid appellant an 
additional $5,000.00 which appellant represented as necessary . 
to obtain financing. Thatcher made payment in reliance on 
the same repr~sentations as noted above. This money was also 
deposited in the business account and spent in the regular 
course of business. The money never remained in a escrow 
account as promised by appellant. 
On the 17th day of June, 1978, Thatcher paid an 
additional $10,000.00 in reliance on the following repre-
sentations made by appellant: 
1. Candland and Thatcher's financial 
statement was insufficient to obtain 
financing (R. at 189); 
2. Appellant had substantial capital 
and was willing to invest with Candland 
and Thatcher and become their partner; 
3. The first and last months payment 
of $20,000.00 had to be paid immediately 
to facilitate approval of the financing; 
4. Appellant would invest $10,000.00 
if Candland and Thatcher could come up with an 
additional $10,000.00; 
5. Financing had been approved; and 
6. The $10,000.00 would be .returned once 
the funding was actually obtained (R. at 191-193). 
-4-
~: 
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The money paid to Western Heritage was deposited in 
Western's business account and spent in the regular course 
of business. 
In August of 1978, Thatcher paid $22,000.00 to 
Western Heritage. The payment was induced by these 
representations: 
1. The funding previously approved 
had fallen through; 
2. Additional up front money was 
needed to secure new funding; 
3. Appellant would put up $50,000.00 
of his own funds to obtain the f inanc-
ing; and 
4. The money would only be needed for 
a couple of days (R. at 193). 
Of the $22,000.00 mentioned above, $14,000.00 was paid out 
to get the financing. Some of the $14,000.00 was returned 
and placed in the business account along with the remaining 
$8,000.00. This money was spent in the regular course of 
business.by appellant. 
At trial the appellant attempted to repeat state-
ments allegedly made by a financier to prove that financing 
was indeed availa~le to Western Heritage (R. at 240,241,302, 
303). These statements were excluded as hearsay by the court. 
The court ruled that the statements were being offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted. 
-5-
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At the close of the evidence, appellant requested 
that the jury receive an instruction on the elements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-17 (1953), which reads as follows: 
77-31-17. False pretenses-Evidence 
of .~Upon a trial for having· obtained, 
with an intent to cheat or defraud an-
other designedly by any false pretense, 
the signature of any person to a written 
instrument, or from any person any money, 
personal property or valuable thing, the 
def~ndant shall not be convict~d; if the 
false pretense was expressed in language, 
unaccompanied by a false token or writing, 
unless the pretense or some note or memo-
randum thereof is in writing, subscribed 
by or in the handwriting of the defendant, 
or unless the pre~ense is proved by the 
testimony of two witnesses, or that of one 
witness and corroborating circumstances; 
but this section shall not apply to a 
prosecution for falsely representing or 
personating another, and in such assumed 
character marrying, or receiving any money 
or property. 
The Court refused to give an instruction covering that 
Statute, but did instruct the jury on the elements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 and § 76-6-405 (1953) as 
amended. 
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ARGU!-IBNT 
POINT I 
THE REFUSAL TO SUBMIT AN INSTRUCTION 
ON UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-31-17 (1953), 
AS AMENDED, WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
A 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-31-17 
(1953), AS AMENDED, HAS BEEN 
REPEALED BY IMPLICATION. 
In 1973, the Utah Legislature expressly repealed 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-8 (1953), as amended, which defined 
the crime of "False Pretense" in the Criminal Code. See 
Ballaine v. District Court, 107 Utah 247, 255, 153 P.2d 
265, 267 (1944). The legislature, however, failed to expressly 
repeal from the Code of Criminal Procedure Utah Code Ann. § 
77-31-17 (1953), as amended, concerning the evidence required 
in a false pretense case. 
Respondent submits that the statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-31-17, was repealed by implication with the repeal 
of Section 76-20-8 and simultaneous adoption of Utah Code 
Ann. § 7 6- 6- 4 0 3 ( 19 7 3) . 
Section 76-6-403 (1973), defines "Theft" as those 
offenses "heretofore known as la'rceny, larceny by trick, 
larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion 
" (Emphasis added.) 
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It is clear that the offense of Theft now includes False 
Pretense. The separate offense of False Pretense no longer 
exists; that offense is now known as Theft. It logically 
follows that Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-17 is of no force 
and effect. Since the offense of false pretense, as a 
separate, unique cause of action does not exist, applica-
tion of the eyidence requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 
77-31-17 never arises. 
Appellant does not dispute that False Pretense 
and the new inclusive crime of Theft proscribe the same 
conduct (Appellant's Brief at 8 and 9). The statutes, 
therefore, cover the same subject. Under Utah law 
subsequently enacted statutes generally supersede prior 
existing statutes when they relate to the same subject. 
Pride Club v. Miller, 572 P.2d 385 (Utah 1977). 
Later enactments also take precedence over prior 
enactments where the two are plainly inconsistent. Thiokol 
Chemical Corp. v. Peterson, 15 Utah 2d 355, 393 P.2d 391 
(1964). In this case, Sections 77-31-17 and 76-6-403 do 
conflict. They differ as to the evidence that can be 
used to prove Theft. Unlike Section 77-31-17, Section 
76-6-403 does not require a writing or two witnesses or one 
witness with corroborating circumstances. Instead, Section 
76-6-403 states, in part: 
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An accusation of theft may be 
supported by evidence that it was 
corrunitted in any manner specified in 
sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410, 
Not one of the sections referred to (Sections 76-6-404 
through 76-6-410) require the same evidence as does 
Section 77-31-17. In this case, theft was shown at 
trial by the manner specified in Sections 76-6-404 and 
76-6-405. Because of the conflict between the more 
recent enactments and Section 77-31-17, this procedure 
was proper and Section 76-6-403 (1973) controls. 
B 
THE STATE SATISFIED THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-31-17 (1953), AS 
AMENDED. 
Even if the statute was not repealed by 
implication, the prosecution nonetheless met the 
evidentiary requirements of Section 77-31-17. Those 
requirements are that the false pretense be shown by: 
1. A writing (note or memorandum) subscribed 
by or in the handwriting of the defendant, or 
2. Testimony of two witnesses, or 
3. Testimony of one witness and corroborating 
circumstances. 
It should be noted, contrary to appellant's 
belief, these requirements are disjunctive and, therefore, 
corroboration is not essential (Appellant's Brief at 12). 
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The transcript of this case indicates that documents 
were admitted as evidence of appellant's false representa-
tions. One example is appellant's promise to keep the money 
received by Western in an escrow account rather than a 
general business account (State's Exhibit No. 13). The 
transcript clearly shows that more than two witnesses 
testified for the State (R.160,161). Under Section 
77-31-17 the testimony of Candland and Thatcher was 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements. The failure to give 
a requested instruction concerning alternative theories 
is not error where the instruction was cumulative and amply 
covered by other instructions given. State v. Martinez, 
21 Utah 2d 187, 442 P.~d 943, 944 (1968). 
c 
FAILURE TO SUBMIT APPELLANT'S 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NAS HARMLESS 
ERROR. 
Should this Court find that the refusal to 
instruction on Section 77-31-17 was error, such refusal 
did not prejudice the substantive rights of the appellant 
and, thus, does not justify reversal of the conviction. 
This Court has on numerous occasions pointed out 
that it "will not reverse criminal cases for mere error 
or irregularity." State v. Neal, 1 Utah 2d 122, 262 P.2d 
756 (1953). Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953), as amended, 
provides: 
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After hearing an appeal the court 
must give judgment without regard to 
errors or defects which do not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. If 
error has been committed, it shall not be 
presumed to have resulted in prejudice. 
The court must be satisfied that it 
has that effect before it is warranted 
in reversing the judgment. 
Refusal to give an instruction cannot be the basis for 
reversal if the jury is sufficiently advised of the 
issue they are to determine, or it appears that they 
were not confused or misled to the prejudice of the 
defendant. State v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 491 
P. 2d 1093 I 1095 (1971). 
As noted above, the requirements of Section 
77-31717 were established by the State at trial. 
Appellant does not contest that fact. Determination of 
whether a writing had been submitted or whether the testimony 
of two witnesses had been heard can be made by examination 
of the transcript. These determinations, therefore, did 
not require special consideration by a jury. Therefore, 
failure to instruct the jury did not prejudice the appellant 
and cannot be the basis for a reversal. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDgD APPELLANT'S 
PROFFERED STATEMENTS SINCE THE STATEMENTS WERE 
HEARSAY AND OFFERED FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER 
ASSERTED. 
Hearsay is defined by Rule 63 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence as: 
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Evidence of a statement which is 
made other than by a witness while 
testifying at the hearing offered 
to prove the matter asserted. 
As a defense to the theft charges, appellant 
attempted to prove that he made an honest effort to 
obtain financing for the restaurant of Candland and 
Thatcher. The appellant chose to establish this point 
by referring to statements made to him by Mr. King and 
other financiers, the alleged source of funding for the 
project. The statements made by King would have proved 
the actual existence of financing, but Mr. King was 
never called by the appellant. Respondent submits that 
if appellant wished to establish what Mr. King said 
with_regard to financing, then the only alternative 
was to call Mr. King as a witness. 
Appellant made no effort to establish that 
Mr. King was unavailable for trial nor did appellant 
establish that any effort had been made to locate Mr. King. 
Appellant suggests that the evidence introduced 
by respondent was based on a theory of deception. The 
information filed was issued with alternative pleadings 
involving Theft or Theft by Deception. Respondent's theory 
was: fl) appellant exercised ''unauthorized control" over 
the property of Candland and Thatcher when he used the 
money for regular business. Appellant was authorized 
to hold the money in escrow. He was not authorized to take 
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~ 
the money from escrow or use the funds for Western Heritage; 
(2) appellant deceived Candland and Thatcher when he 
advised them that the money was in escrow, that financing 
had been obtained, and that he would match funds with 
the investment of Candland and Thatcher. 
The jury was instructed on both charges. The 
verdict does not indicate which theory the jury relied 
on to convict appellant. Appellant's statement that he 
was convicted for acts of deception is not totally correct. 
A conviction for theft would not require evidence of 
deception. Therefore, the statements by a third party 
(Mr. King and other financiers) would be immaterial to a 
conviction. 
Appellant and v. o. Adams testified that Western 
Heritage attempted to obtain financing from several sources. 
Both witnesses testified that they relied on the representa-
tions made by those sources. 
Appellant was attempting to prove that an honest 
effort was made on his behalf to obtain financing for the 
victims. Appellant was able to do that without introducing 
the statements of an out-of-court witness. The statements 
of the.financier were not material to the issue and therefore 
were properly excluded by the trial court. 
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The statements of Mr. King and other financiers 
do not fit into the recognized exception regarding "state 
of mind." In order to satisfy the "state of mind" exception 
under Rule 63(12), Utah Rules of Evidence, the statements 
must be offered to show the declarant's (King's) state 
of mind. Appellant claims that he offered the statements 
of Mr. King to show appellant's state of mind. The court 
ruled that such evidence was not admissible because it was 
not offered to show Mr. King's state of mind. 
Appellant cites Frank v. United States, 220 F.2d 
559 (10th Cir. 1955), as controlling on the question of 
whether King's statements were admissible. In Frank, the 
r 
' ' 
court said that statements of a third party were admissible fi 
to prove that the defendant relief on such statements and 
representations because the statements were not offered 
to show the truth (or falsity) of the charges in the 
complaints. In this case, appellant was not attempting 
to prove that he relied on the statements of a third party 
(Mr. King). The appellant was attempting to show that he 
made an effort to obtain financing from various sources. 
In Hoffmann v. United States, 353 F.2d 188, 190 
(10th Cir. 1965), the court cited Frank for the proposition 
that good faith is material to the defense in a fraud case. 
' 
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However, the court also stated that hearsay could not be 
used to show good faith; good faith must be shown by "proper. 
evidence," The appellant was able to show that he made a 
good faith effort to obtain financing without relating the 
conversations of Mr. King. Appellant testified as 
to the sources he or Valoy o. Adams contacted and what 
efforts he made to obtain such financing. Therefore, the 
statements of Mr. King were not material to the case. 
Hearsay has historically been categorized as 
inadmissible evidence because it is unreliable. The jury 
is not allowed to judge the credibility of the declarant 
and there is always the chance that the witness will 
fabricate or exaggerate the alleged atatements of a third 
person. Exceptions to the hearsay rule were carved out 
due to the trustworthy character of certain hearsay evidence. 
But when the evidence, such as the proffered statements in 
this case, is not shown to have a trustworthy or reliable 
quality, due to its self-serving nature, then the policy 
against admitting unreliable evidence is met by excluding 
those statements. The trial court properly excluded 
the statements after determining that the statements were 
hearsay and offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 
If this Court finds that it was error to exclude 
the testimony of Mr. King or other financiers, respondent 
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submits that it was harmless error. Proof of deception 
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(2) did not turn on 
the admission or exclusion of King's statements. Deception 
was shown at trial by the testimony of witnesses and by 
the introduction of documents signed by appellant. 
Failure to allow admission of appellant's proffered 
evidence did not prejudice his substantive rights and was 
therefore, harmless error, if error at all. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err in refusing to 
instruct the jury on Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-17 (1953), 
as it has been repealed and ·superseded by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-403 through 76-6-410 (1973). The later enactments, 
effective in 1973, take precedence over Section 77-31-17. 
The evidence proffered by appellant at trial 
was properly excluded as hearsay since King's statements 
were offered to show the truth of the matter asserted: 
that financing was available. If this Court finds, 
however, that the lower court did err, respondent submits 
that only harmless error was committed. 
Respondent prays for this Court to aff i~m 
appellant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
At 
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